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Book Review
The Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and
Global Justice, by Roger Burbach
Publisher: Zed Books (2004)
Price: $22.50
Reviewed by: Kristen Eichensehr
While most accounts of the prosecution of Augusto Pinochet focus on
the undoubtedly dramatic progression of Pinochet's case in the British
courts, Roger Burbach takes a different tack, construing The Pinochet Affair
to include the pre- and post-history surrounding the British proceedings.
Burbach draws on his personal familiarity with Chile since the 1970s-he
fled the country during Pinochet's coup overthrowing Salvador Allende -
and interviews with prominent figures in the Chilean human rights
movement, judiciary, and political sphere. He constructs a picture of
Augusto Pinochet as calculating his ascent to power, developing the
necessary personality to order atrocities in pursuit of power, and using
various tactics to avoid prosecution in Chile after his detention in London.
Burbach tells a lucid story beginning with Pinochet's early years and
continuing through Pinochet's recent evasion of Chilean courts. Burbach's
access to key players in Chile provides especially good insight into the
Chilean attempts to prosecute Pinochet since his return from London.
Burbach trumpets the Spanish and British judicial actions against
Pinochet as a triumph of the human rights movement. He argues that the
Pinochet affair more firmly ensconced the idea of universal jurisdiction in
international law and that it inspired campaigns by human rights
organizations to bring other human rights violators, such as Uganda's Idi
Amin and Paraguay's Alfredo Stroessner, to justice. He praises the
establishment of the International Criminal Court as a "critical event in the
advance of human rights law"' and touts the attempted Belgian
prosecution of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. But he condemns the
1. ROGER BURBACH, THE PINOCHET AFFAIR: STATE TERRORISM AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 156
(2003).
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NATO intervention to protect human rights in Kosovo.
An important issue about the book is the author's apparent lack of
objectivity. Readers should be aware that Burbach allows his political
views to pervade his analysis. In the preface and introduction his
reverential attitude toward Salvador Allende becomes apparent and
appears to compromise his objectivity. Burbach also does not hide his
current political views, particularly his opposition to Tony Blair and
George W. Bush. The "state terrorism" referred to in the title extends, in the
author's opinion, to include current United States' policies.
Notwithstanding the author's political views, the book tells an interesting
and clear story about Pinochet, but the prevalence of the author's
viewpoint, inserted throughout, renders suspect his attempts to draw
larger implications from the Pinochet affair.
On a more theoretical level, Burbach wholly embraces universal
jurisdiction for the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights, but he
takes this position as axiomatic and does not address any potential
challenges to it. Burbach leaves several questions unanswered.
First, if the choice is between a peaceful governmental transition and
prosecution of a former dictator, who makes the choice? After a shocking
loss in the 1989 elections, one of Pinochet's major conditions for granting a
peaceful transition of power was a guarantee against prosecution for his
regime. He had already partially secured such a guarantee by passing an
amnesty law, exempting from prosecution any crimes occurring between
his ascension to power and 1978, though the regime's crimes did not stop
in 1978. After the election, Pinochet still wielded enormous power in Chile,
including through his position as head of the Army. In such circumstances,
the new government did not act entirely freely in agreeing not to prosecute
members of Pinochet's government. Burbach argues that the new
government viewed the compromise as necessary to effect the transfer of
power and take office without challenge by Pinochet and his substantial
remaining forces. If an international prosecution of Pinochet had begun at
this point, it could have destabilized the fragile compromise that had
facilitated the ouster of Pinochet's government. Though many in Chile
would have undoubtedly liked to see Pinochet prosecuted for his abuses in
the early 1990s, according to Burbach, the new government did not have a
secure enough hold on power to repel a challenge if a threatened Pinochet
summoned the army for another coup. If Pinochet had traveled abroad in
the early 1990s and had been prosecuted by Spain or Britain, Chile might
have descended into civil war, precipitated by the international judicial
intervention into the non-prosecution compromise. Burbach touts the
virtues of the international prosecution, but does not address its potentially
destabilizing effects.
A second question is whether, if the people of a country have
legitimately decided that prosecution of a former dictator is not in the best
interests of their country, can or should that decision be overruled by an
international judge attempting to enforce human rights? With his
seemingly unreflective embrace of universal jurisdiction, Burbach does not
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address this scenario. In Chile, the non-prosecution compromise was
reached amongst the political elites, not as a result of a democratic
referendum. But it is possible that a country could democratically decide
that truth and reconciliation commissions or merely general immunity are
more important for the country than prosecution of former rulers who
committed crimes against the people. Burbach seems to put words in the
mouth of the Chileans when describing their response to Pinochet's arrest
in London. He writes, "[tihey knew that the institutional arrangements of
the country had ensured that Pinochet, the symbol of repression, would
not be tried at home. If justice came from Spain via England, so be it."2
International prosecution of Pinochet was arguably very appropriate
because he had manipulated the legal system and retained sufficient power
to make Chilean prosecution unlikely, but if the Chilean situation had been
one where the people supported foregoing prosecution, then the legitimacy
of intervention by an international judge becomes questionable. It is
unclear whether or why a foreign judge should be allowed to insert himself
into the politically-charged legal processes of another state if the
population of that state has democratically decided not to prosecute former
abusers.
This second question is instructive in the Chilean case despite the fact
that the initial decision not to prosecute Pinochet and members of his
regime was politically motivated. Upon Pinochet's return from London
after being released on the order of Britain's foreign secretary for
"humanitarian reasons," 3 Burbach claims that seventy percent of Chileans
wanted Pinochet to stand trial,4 and cases had already been brought
against Pinochet in the Appeals Court of Santiago starting in January 1998.
With Pinochet's return from London, cases against the former dictator
multiplied and were permitted to proceed thanks to Chilean Appeals Court
Judge Juan Guzmdn Tapia who allowed the argument, later upheld by the
Chilean Supreme Court, that the charges were exempt from the Amnesty
Law of 1978 because the cases of those who were "disappeared" were
continuing crimes as long as the fate of the "disappeared" was unknown.
Judge Guzmdin pursued Pinochet's prosecution as it moved up and down
the Chilean court system, with appeals on various issues reaching the
Chilean Supreme Court. Pinochet ultimately evaded prosecution with
claims of ill health because Chile's leaders continued to fear that the
military would side with Pinochet if he were convicted.
Though Pinochet himself escaped prosecution, other members of his
regime did not. On the day that Pinochet was exempted from further
proceedings because of his health, Judge Guzmdn began prosecutions of
five military officials for torture committed in the 1970s.5 Prosecutions of
lower level officials have continued along with investigations of military
abuses, including disappearances.
2. Id. at 204.
3. Id. at 122.
4. Id. at 125.
5. Id. at 141.
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Barely ten years after Pinochet left power, the Chilean courts were
confident enough and the country was stable enough for the former
dictator to be prosecuted. Even though the prosecution ultimately did not
result in trial, it opened the door for further prosecutions of others who
committed atrocities. Pinochet manipulated the legal system by packing
the Supreme Court with his appointees and by issuing the Amnesty Law.
But by 2001, most of his appointees were retired and the sitting courts
found a way around the Amnesty Law. The proliferation of prosecutions
for Pinochet-era abuses demonstrates that although the Chilean courts
could not prosecute Pinochet and others in the immediate aftermath of
their rule, a few years of distance from the regime did allow the Chilean
domestic courts to function in this capacity. Burbach's analysis of this trend
is perplexing because though he provides examples of lower-level officials
who were prosecuted and convicted for human rights abuses in Chilean
courts, his wholesale embrace of universal jurisdiction seems to reject the
idea that national courts could ever prosecute their former leaders in the
same way. Burbach does not consider the possibility that with sufficient
time national court systems might evolve and gain enough power to try
their former leaders effectively.
By failing to question the wisdom of universal jurisdiction, Burbach
avoids the deeper moral of "the Pinochet affair:" foreign prosecution of
former dictators may not be universally desirable. The International
Criminal Court at least provides a neutral international forum for human
rights prosecutions, but exercises of universal jurisdiction by individual
countries, though possible after the Pinochet case, may be neither wise nor
desirable in some instances. Decisions about whether or not to prosecute
former leaders may be more properly made by the dictators' countrymen,
and for reasons of domestic stability and in the name of transitioning from
dictatorship, the decision may sometimes be not to prosecute. Before
calling for international prosecution, the international community should
carefully examine why the former dictator has not been prosecuted in his
own country and ensure that foreign intervention would not have
deleterious effects on the country's transition from dictatorship. Patience
may also be a virtue in international decisions to intervene to prosecute a
foreign dictator. As Chile shows, within a few years a country may become
stable enough and willing to challenge a former dictator in court.
Ultimately, a domestic prosecution is likely to have more legitimacy in the
eyes of the world and the victims than a foreign intervention, however
well-intentioned and legally permissible.
[Vol. 9
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The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, by
Matthew Gibney
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (2004)
Price: £17.99
Reviewed by: Nicole Hallett
In The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, Matthew Gibney explores the
ethical and political dimensions of the international refugee regime and
uses this analysis to propose a new regime that would more adequately
account for the flaws he sees in the current system. In determining which
rights belong to both refugees and to countries of asylum, Gibney divides
theorists into two main camps: impartialists, who advocate for open
borders based on either rights-based or utilitarian principles, and
partialists, who assert that "states, in their role as representatives of
communities of citizens, are morally justified in enacting entrance policies
that privilege the interests of their members."1 In the end, Gibney finds
neither theory convincing and thus proposes that refugee policy should be
guided by a new blended model he calls "humanitarianism."
Unfortunately for his readers, this model, which is presented with much
fanfare at the end of the book, falls short of providing a workable
alternative. In the end, Gibney's proposed solution both fails to advance a
regime that is substantially different from the one already in place and fails
to account for the complex ethical dilemmas that plague the other theories
he considers and then ultimately discards. Although Gibney himself may
disagree, the book is best seen as a primer of the ethical and political facets
of the international refugee regime, a role that it fulfills admirably.
Gibney's greatest strength is convincingly advocating for and then
against each argument he presents. This strength is on display most
prominently in his treatment of partialism. Traditionally, human rights
advocates have viewed such a position as a way for states to shirk their
1. MATTHEW GIBNEY, THE ETHICS AND POLMCS OF ASYLUM 23 (Cambridge University
Press 2004).
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responsibilities to the world's most vulnerable people. Gibney obviously
shares many of these suspicions himself, and yet, he argues effectively that
a community should have a right to self-determination. Human rights
advocates who work tirelessly to defend the right of indigenous groups to
preserve their culture are often the first to dismiss similar claims of nation-
states. Yet, clearly if such a right to cultural self-determination exists, then
all cultural communities, however large or small, should be able to protect
that right, which may mean excluding outsiders that threaten the cultural
composition of the community.
It is precisely because Gibney presents partialism in the most favorable
light that his later critique of the theory is so gratifying. The place where
the partialist analysis breaks down, he argues, is with the assumption that
the nation-state is solely a cultural community. Nation-states are also
territorial entities with dominion over land as well as resources. Gibney
argues that "partialists are backed into justifying the results of a historical
process of carving up the world's territory between states that primarily
has been achieved through the force of arms, and has (accordingly)
resulted in a gross mismatch between human need and natural resources." 2
Furthermore, it is unclear which cultural community partialists aim to
protect. Very few modem nation-states have a homogenous cultural
community; in fact, most encompass multiple ethnic and cultural groups.
In these cases, who decides which cultural community to protect?
Partialists often work under the unspoken assumption that it is the
dominant cultural community that needs protecting, which is the reason
that this viewpoint smacks of racism in the current political debate.
However, Gibney is cautious about making such an accusation, and
instead focuses on the legitimate state interests at stake.
At all times, Gibney is careful to balance the ethical and the practical.
In his discussion of impartialism, he lays the foundation by using both a
rights-based and a utilitarian approach. If we recognize a human right to
free movement within states, then a logical corollary is that there exists a
fundamental right to free movement between states. An open borders
policy can also be justified on utilitarian grounds. As long as migration will
increase the efficiency by which the world's resources are utilized, then
states have a moral obligation to allow people in, even at the detriment of
their own citizens. Gibney is simultaneously drawn to and uncomfortable
with both the rights-based and utilitarian approaches to an open border
policy. He is seduced by the simplicity of reasoning and yet cannot fully
embrace the potential consequences of implementing such a system,
including the likely demise of the welfare state and the potential
destabilization of many of the world's liberal democracies.
The reader is left with a keen sense for the ethical conflict at stake. The
refugee has an acute interest in obtaining asylum. Yet, liberal democracies
have an obligation to their own citizens that may necessitate the closing of
2. Id. at 39.
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their borders and the rejection of legitimate asylum-seekers. Gibney
concedes that both sides are motivated by legitimate moral values, which
allows him to go further in both exploring the conflict and explaining the
political quagmire that results.
Gibney defines the problem in such an insightful way that the reader is
left anxious to hear his proposed solution. It is perhaps because of such
high expectations that his attempt seems disappointing. Part of the
problem lies with the fact that Gibney has prefaced the entire discussion on
the belief that the current asylum system is not working. Yet, it is unclear
whether his idea differs in any substantial way. Gibney proposes a system
called "humanitarianism,"- which he defines as "the principle... that states
have an obligation to assist refugees when the costs of doing so are low,"
3
i.e. without threatening the civil, political and social rights of liberal
democratic states.
However, in teasing out the practical implications of adhering to this
principle, Gibney seems relatively satisfied with the system as it stands, or
at least unable to recommend how it should be changed. For instance, he
discusses the possibility that humanitarianism may require states to
dismantle non-arrival measures used to prevent asylum-seekers from
seeking refuge. However, he stops short of making this a recommendation,
citing an inability to predict the consequences of such a move as a reason
for caution. He instead suggests that states need to make these decisions
based on a subjective analysis of their own capacities. Yet the reason that
asylum is such a politically charged issue is because states feel that their
capacities have already been reached. Gibney's system would allow states
to maintain the status quo, or worse, would give them justification for
implementing even more restrictive entrance policies because of
prohibitive costs.
Gibney seems less than enamored with non-refoulement as the
cornerstone of refugee policy, but non-refoulement works precisely
because it allows for no exceptions. Although Gibney is right that more
emphasis should be placed on resettlement, his suggestion that it could one
day replace non-refoulement is naYve. Resettlement must exist in tandem
with non-refoulement in order to provide effective protection of refugees,
and Gibney admits as much in his subsequent analysis. Again, the
application of "humanitarianism" to the asylum problem seems to yield no
better results than the theories that have dominated the book up to this
point.
His most useful insights concern the interplay between politics and
asylum. It is important for anyone working in the field of human rights to
understand the pressures politicians face and the motivations that compel
them towards certain actions. Gibney understands the contradictions
inherent in representative democracies. The populace can be both the
biggest defender of human rights and their worst enemy. Asylum presents
3. Id. at 231.
20920061
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a particular problem because the people most affected by a country's
asylum policies are by definition not part of the political community.
Politicians by necessity must listen to the wishes of their constituents and
must react to the tides of public opinion if they wish to stay in office.
Additionally, assuming a leadership role on the issue poses special risks
that may or may not be possible to overcome. Although none of these
observations appear particularly novel, they are rarely recognized by
human rights advocates, who often expect politicians to disregard political
realities. Not surprisingly, when they approach the problem with this
attitude, they rarely get the results they want.
In the end, Gibney's greatest contribution to the debate on asylum is to
illustrate exactly how complex the problem actually is. In doing so, he has
provided a set of criteria by which to evaluate asylum policies, and these
criteria may ultimately be an even more valuable contribution than his own
proposed policies.
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Torture: A Collection, edited by Sanford
Levinson
Publisher: Oxford University Press (2004)
Price: $29.95
Reviewed by: Mihailis E. Diamantis
"Pandora's box is open."1 While we may at first shirk at the possibility
of openly discussing the brutal practices signified by the word "torture,"
either out of revulsion for the topic itself or out of a fear that doing so
opens the conceptual possibility of its being legitimated, torture is a fact of
life. Despite absolute prohibitions in international law on state use of
torture, "torture is practiced on a regular basis in more countries than
ever." 2 It is in this present shroud of secretive decisions to violate some of
our most fundamental human rights that Sanford Levinson has sought to
play a part in the rightfully public debate and in the resolution of the
difficult questions that the practice of torture raises. In his Torture: A
Collection, Levinson has assembled contributions from some of the most
influential thinkers dealing with torture. The resulting panoply is engaging
if only for its diversity of approaches-from the strictly historical to the
strictly legal, from the abstractly philosophical to the brutally pragmatic.
Believing that "[i]t is vitally important that we discuss what is being done
in our name,"3 Levinson has attempted to bring essays that engage in the
"increasingly important debate over the possibility that torture, at least in
some carefully specified circumstances, might be a 'lesser evil' than some
other 'greater evil' that menaces society."
4
Oren Gross asserts in his contribution that "[tihe debate about the
moral and legal nature of the prohibition on torture is often conducted as if
1. Henry Shue, Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 47,47 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
2. Ariel Dorfman, Foreword to TORTURE, supra note 1, at 3, 5.
3. Sanford Levinson, Contemplating Torture: An Introduction, TORTURE , supra note 1, at 23,
38.
4. Id. at 24.
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there is no middle ground." 5 That is to say, the contending positions in the
debate most often are those of the absolutist, who asserts that torture can
never be justified-e.g. Ariel Dorfman's impassioned proclamation: "[N]o
torture anytime, anywhere, no to torturing anyone; no to torture" 6-and
those who believe that there are moral, and that there should
consequentially be legal, exceptions to the general prohibition against
torture. Gross's "middle ground" proposes that there be an "absolute legal
ban" on torture,7 but that we "call[] on public officials having to deal with
the catastrophic case to consider the possibility of acting outside the legal
order while openly acknowledging their actions and the extralegal nature
of such actions. Those officials must assume the risks involved in acting
extralegally."s
Gross has indeed found a middle ground; the only problem though, at
least for Levinson's purported public debate, is that it is nearly the same
middle ground found and supported by the majority of the authors in
Torture. Thus, Richard A. Posner believes that that it is best "to leave in
place the customary legal prohibitions, but with the understanding that of
course they will not be enforced in extreme circumstances." 9 Henry Shue
similarly writes: "An act of torture ought to remain illegal so that anyone
who sincerely believes such an act to be the least available evil is placed in
the position of needing to justify his or her act morally in order to defend
himself or herself legally." 10 Michael Walzer, Jean Bethke Elshtain, John T.
Parry, the Israeli Supreme Court, and Miriam Gur-Arye all take similar
views: there ought to be broad and absolute legal prohibitions on torture,
with extra-legal exceptions in certain extreme cases. Of course they reach
their conclusions via somewhat differing lines of reasoning-e.g. Posner
conducts cost-benefit analyses while Elshtain utilizes more
philosophical/ theological modes of argument. Similarly, there are
sometimes slight variations in characterizing which extralegal uses of
torture may be appropriate-e.g. the Israeli Supreme Court says that
,necessity" ought to be the bar while Gur-Arye believes it should be "self-
defense."'1
Thus, the debate as presented in Torture takes place almost entirely on
Gross's "middle ground." To be fair, Dorfman explicitly and Richard H.
Weisberg implicitly represent some part of the absolutist position, but their
essays occupy the beginning and cap the end of the collection, bypassing
what could have been a vigorous debate in the middle bulk of the volume;
5. Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law, in TORTURE, supra note 1,
at 229, 229.
6. Dorfman, supra note 2 at 17.
7. Gross, supra note 5, at 234.
8. Id. at 241.
9. Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE, supra note 1, at 291,
296.
10. Henry Shue, Torture, TORTURE, supra note 1, at 47, 58.
11. Miriam Gur-Arye, Can the War Against Terror Justify the Use of Force in Interrogations?:
Reflections in Light of the Israeli Experience, in TORTURE, supra note 1, at 183, 192-94.
[Vol. 9
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indeed, they cite to none of the other authors. Posner does criticize
Dorfman for his being "overwrought in tone [and] irresponsible in
content,"12 but this hardly constitutes the debate Levinson promises. Alan
Dershowitz offers once again his famous proposal that the best way to
reduce the amount of torture, given that we know officials presently
practice it behind closed doors, is to legalize torture if the official obtains a
judicially awarded warrant. These remarks prompt some mutually
engaging comments from other authors, but nevertheless fail to grapple
with the central issue of when, if ever, torture should justified legally or
morally. Where are the "brazen Kantians" a3 whom all authors reference or
those officials who believe that "'[i]f you don't violate someone's human
rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job?'" 14 Without
their voices, we have not a debate but a mutually supportive discussion,
albeit, one which, if credited, has important implications for both national
and international human rights policy.
Some of the most interesting articles are those which occur outside the
context of the "middle ground" discussion, indeed, outside of the debate
entirely. John H. Langbein offers an early legal history of torture and
concludes that "[h]istory's most important lesson is that it has not been
possible to make coercion compatible with truth."15 If this is the case,
though, he must answer the further question of why, if it is fully
inefficacious, torture is so routinely practiced in the present day with the
specific intent of obtaining information. Might it be that all means of proof,
including torture, utilized in medieval Europe and England were less
effective than their modern counterparts at reaching truth? Oona A.
Hathaway, in an entirely different vein, presents empirical evidence that
counter-intuitively suggests that the widely celebrated Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment may "not always have the intended effect of reducing torture
in countries that ratify, but, in some cases, the opposite might even be
true."16 She explains these results by drawing on the importance of
domestic enforcement mechanisms of international norms and the
significant role reputational effects play in countries' decisions to ratify
international human rights treaties. Hathaway thus offers important
lessons for those who would seek to proscribe torture, and human rights
violations generally, using international law. Fionnaula Ni Aolain also
discuses the failures (and successes) of international legal efforts to
eliminate torture in the European context. Finally, Mark Osiel contributes
an extremely provocative piece to the collection. Analyzing stories from
Argentina's recent past with torture, he humanizes not only the victims of
12. Posner, supra note 9, at 295.
13. Gross, supra note 5, at 238.
14. Levinson, supra note 3, at 27.
15. John H. Langbein, The Legal History of Torture, in TORTURE, supra note 1, at 93, 101.
16. Oona H. Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture, in
TORTURE, supra note 1, at 199, 199, 201.
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torture, but also the torturers.
Whatever criticism (considerable) should rightly be leveled at these
men, however, they are in no way 'banal,' in Arendt's sense. They
are not unthinking automatons .... Yet neither is it easy to
characterize their evil as satanic or 'radical,' in Kant's sense, for
they do not willfully embrace the opposite of what they know to be
the right or good.17
He then unpacks the significance of his argument for international criminal
institutions that would hold torturers accountable for their actions.
Torture: A Collection, then, certainly deserves the attention of both
human rights advocates and theorists, as well as that of the general reader.
The general public interested in the issues torture presents will find in
Levinson's collection a preeminently accessible resource, touching many
facets of the issue. The theorist, while perhaps not finding a "debate" as
such, will encounter nuanced presentations of a "middle ground" in
torture theory which has until now received too little attention. Lastly, the
advocate, in his search to abolish the practice of all (unjustified) torture,
will discover historical lessons, practical advice on international law, and a
survey of the present state of the world on the matter. "We are staring into
an abyss, and no one can escape the necessity of a response." 18 The public,
the theorist, and the advocate must offer the world a response to the
practice of torture, and Levinson's collection has assured that that
response, when it comes, will be one which has been more thoroughly
considered.
17. Mark Osiel, The Mental State of Torturers: Argentina's Dirty War, in TORTURE, supra note
1, at 129, 139-40.
18. Levinson, supra note 3, at 39.
[Vol. 9
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Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and
Development in Africa, edited by Paul
Tiyambe Zeleza and Philip J. McConnaughay
Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press (2004)
Price: $49.95
Reviewed by: Margaret Hellerstein
The 1990s saw a wave of democratization across Africa that
transformed the political landscape of the continent. Before 1990, all but a
very few states were ruled by one-party or one-man regimes, and (with the
exception of apartheid leaders), no African leader had ever left office due
to an electoral defeat. By the end of the 1990s, however, virtually all the
sub-Saharan African states had begun, or attempted to begin, the process of
democratization. Yet many of these regimes are democracies only in name.
Although the political systems have changed, human rights abuses are
rampant and, in many countries, the pretense of multiparty elections is just
that. Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa, edited by
Paul Tiyambe Zeleza and Philip J. McConnaughay, explores in detail the
issues these nascent democracies face, asking how states with unstable and
corrupt regimes can move from the first phase of democratization to the
implementation of the rule of law. Through essays contributed by scholars
and human rights activists, the book presents different perspectives on the
issues arising from Africa's democratization in the 1990s. The collection
addresses a series of questions about this period of democratization. What
went wrong? What went right? What can we learn from the successes and
failures of the 1990s about how to tackle current problems? In collecting
these essays, Zeleza and McConnaughay seek to address the underlying
phenomena and historical events that have influenced, and will continue to
influence, the degree of democratic success in establishing rule of law.
The essays cohere into three sections. The first examines Western and
African discourses on human rights, asking how universalism and
relativism may be balanced to achieve justice as well as respect for cross-
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cultural norms. The second section examines more practical dimensions of
the protection and subversion of human rights on the African continent
with respect to development and politics, asking whether the language of
human rights translates into actual changes for the populations. The final
section looks at the role of NGOs in contributing to development and
human rights in Africa.
The first section, "Universalism and Relativism in Human Rights
Discourse," asks whether the benchmarks used to judge a state's protection
of its citizens' rights should be determined by Western or other norms.
While this debate is important, it is not new, and neither are the
perspectives introduced in these essays. This section would be a good read
for a beginning student in cultural studies or African history, but not for a
reader with any familiarity with these issues. In addition, this section
leaves two important problems unaddressed. First, relativists focus on the
argument that civil and political rights are less important to African
countries than economic and social rights, taking issue with the Western
concept of the individual rather than the family as the atomic unit.
However, civil and political rights are often necessary to secure economic
and social rights. A functioning democracy that embraces equal rights is
usually better at building a solid infrastructure because all citizens are
involved in its construction. Second, even if privileging individual rights
over collective rights could do violence to cherished African norms, the fact
remains that in some societies, individuals often make decisions for the
family unit. Focusing on collective rights does not always protect the
integrity of the family unit, but rather the socially superior member's
power to make decisions for other individuals in the family unit. The views
and needs of the family, village, or group are not necessarily represented
by those who purport to speak for all of them. This is particularly true with
respect not only to women but also to children, especially girls, who cannot
speak for themselves in any political discourse and may be denied the right
to bodily integrity in practices such as child marriage and female genital
mutilation.
The second group of essays, entitled "The Economic and Political
Dimensions of Human Rights," makes a more substantial contribution to
the discourse. This section critically addresses the progress of human rights
and reform in Africa after the transformative 1990s, examining the extent to
which the new democratic regimes and political upheaval have genuinely
changed the status of human rights in the region. The essays include case
studies of Egypt and Tanzania that examine how progressive reform and
commitment to the rule of law or, alternatively, curtailing of human rights
in the wake of September 11, have strengthened or weakened the human
rights movements in these countries. A comparison between these two
essays lends an interesting framework for the discussion on how countries
have followed the course they set out for themselves in the tumultuous
preceding decade, as well as the influence of global politics and foreign
unrest on the policies of Islamic states. Along those lines, the final essay by
[Vol. 9
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Cassandra Veney examines the ways in which U.S. policy toward Africa
has promoted or hindered human rights and development. Veney offers
the argument, currently embraced by many other advocates, that the key to
securing human rights in the region is business development; aid is a non-
renewable resource that will inevitably provide only a stopgap solution to
the ongoing problems of poverty and political disempowerment. This
section is timely and useful in reexamining the specific problems Africa
now faces fifteen years after the wave of democratization began.
The final section also adds a very useful angle to the debate, following
the second section in addressing the failures of our current instruments
and suggesting possibilities for reform. For a generation that has begun to
wonder whether multilateral treaties and international legal instruments
really carry any weight in securing human rights, NGOs have become the
focus in terms of development and aid. "NGOs and Struggles for Human
Rights" addresses the ways in which NGOs have contributed and can
contribute to the development of adequate and enforceable human rights
policy. Fifteen or twenty years ago, NGOs were an afterthought in the
struggle for human rights; today, the incapacity of major international
organizations like the UN and the WHO fully to address problems on the
ground - and the global proliferation of small NGOs dedicated to a vast
and growing number of concerns - have placed NGOs front and center in
the fight for human rights, both as career paths for potential advocates and
in discussions on foreign policy and aid. Smaller NGOs have an advantage
over larger international organizations in that they are in better touch with
the true situation on the ground and are generally run by members of the
group they aim to help, thus inspiring more confidence and faith in the
population. This is certainly true of many women's groups across the
globe, especially in Muslim countries where the Western goals for women's
rights contrast so sharply with Islamic feminism.
In fact, it was the local finger-on-the-pulse aspect of the smaller African
NGOs that eventually catapulted them into the spotlight. During the
massive wave of democratization, African and international NGOs fought
tirelessly for human rights reform, educating the public and promoting the
cause of human rights to populations that had been deliberately or
incidentally kept in the dark about their potential power to resist
oppressive regimes. These NGOs not only promoted awareness among
African populations but also informed the world at large of the atrocities
suffered by vulnerable groups, thus drawing international attention and
aid to groups that had previously been silenced.
This selection of essays is practical, timely, and forward-looking. Welch
and others address the use of NGOs as an ideological instrument: that is,
while they cannot necessarily rid their countries of human rights abuses,
they create an environment that fosters discussion of the situation, in
which vulnerable groups feel more comfortable speaking out and
authorities are more likely to listen. One criticism of this section is that
these essays do not adequately address the problem of legitimacy and
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accountability of the various NGOs attempting to effect change. To put it
simply, anyone with funding can form an NGO. NGOs, because they do
not answer to government authority, may squander their resources or
simply fall into inefficiency. Even apart from the fact that some NGOs may
work for ideals that human rights advocates would not necessarily
support, they are just as vulnerable to corruption as any other type of
organization. It would have been useful to if this section had considered
how, in the age of the NGO, a global community can work to improve this
generally effective and crucial strategy for the promotion of human rights
and development. Ultimately, this section is quite useful and timely,
although it is covers less new ground than the preceding one.
In sum, this volume would benefit from less emphasis on ideas already
explored elsewhere in the human rights debates with respect to Africa and
other states, as well as a few more truly progressive ideas that introduce
new perspectives into the debate. Ultimately, this volume will prove most
useful to advocates wishing to acquaint themselves with the issues at hand
in African post-millennial human rights and development problems.
However, there is a lot to be said for a reader that asks (and variously
answers) a range of important questions with respect to this critical topic.
To the extent that the book surveys the (admittedly vast and uneven)
terrain of human rights and development in Africa, it does an admirable
job both in compiling a representative group of advocates as contributors
and also in covering the most essential topics. Additionally, the volume
does contain several stand-out essays -that explore new and timely themes.
Ultimately, it is a useful tool in educating the reader on the challenges
Africa will face in turning the promise of human rights and democracy, for
which it fought in the 1990s, into a reality.
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